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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this chapter is to estimate the impact of the major components of the ACA (Medicaid expansion, 
subsidized Marketplace plans, and insurance market reforms) on disparities in insurance coverage after four years. 
We use data from the 2011–2017 waves of the American Community Survey (ACS), with the sample restricted to 
nonelderly adults. Our methods feature a difference-in-difference-in-differences model, developed in the recent 
ACA literature, which separately identifies the effects of the nationwide and Medicaid expansion portions of the 
law. The differences in this model come from time, state Medicaid expansion status, and local area pre-ACA 
uninsured rate. We stratify our sample separately by income, race/ethnicity, marital status, age, gender, and 
geography in order to examine access disparities. After four years, we find that the fully implemented ACA 
eliminated 44 percent of the coverage gap across income groups, with the Medicaid expansion accounting for this 
entire reduction. The ACA also reduced coverage disparities across racial groups by 26.7 percent, across marital 
status by 45 percent, and across age groups by 44 percent, with these changes being partly attributable to both the 
Medicaid expansion and nationwide components of the law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Prior to the main implementation of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) in 2014, there were 
well documented disparities in insurance coverage along multiple dimensions, such as age, race, 
and income (Courtemanche, Marton, and Yelowitz, 2016; Yelowitz, 2016; Courtemanche et al., 
2019b). The central pieces of the ACA, including the individual mandate, subsidized 
Marketplace coverage, and state Medicaid expansions, were designed to reduce health insurance 
coverage disparities by moving the U.S. closer to universal coverage (Obama, 2016; Gruber and 
Sommers, 2019). The purpose of this paper is to examine the extent to which the ACA reduced 
disparities in coverage after four years (2014-2017). 
While gains in insurance coverage after the ACA have been well documented, relatively 
few papers in this literature examine how the ACA affected coverage disparities and none use 
data from 2017. Courtemanche et al. (2017) estimate the first-year impact of the ACA on 
coverage using difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) models where the differences 
come from time, state Medicaid expansion decisions, and pre-ACA local area uninsured rate. 
Similar to the approach taken by Finkelstein (2007) and Miller (2012) to study other coverage 
expansions, this strategy leverages the propensity for universal coverage initiatives to provide the 
most intense “treatment” in local areas with the highest pre-reform uninsured rates. Using data 
from the American Community Survey (ACS), Courtemanche et al. (2017) find that the ACA 
increased coverage by an average of 5.9 percentage points in Medicaid expansion states 
compared to 2.8 percentage points in non-expansion states in 2014. In subsample analyses, the 
authors show that the fully implemented ACA (including the Medicaid expansion) reduced but 
did not eliminate the coverage disparities based on education, race, age, and marital status after 
one year.  
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Courtemanche et al. (2018a) use the same research strategy and data from the Behavioral 
Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS), finding that the ACA reduced but did not eliminate 
the coverage disparity between those with incomes above versus below the median after two 
years (2014-2015). Frean et al. (2017) also use data through 2015 and a DDD approach to find 
that coverage gains from the Medicaid expansion and Marketplace premium subsidies are larger 
among childless adult couples than among single adults or adults with children, but the increase 
from the individual mandate is largest among singles. Courtemanche et al. (2019b) use three 
years of post-ACA data (2014-2016) from the ACS and finds that the ACA Medicaid expansion 
eliminated 43 percent of the coverage gap across income groups. In addition, the authors find 
that the ACA reduced but did not eliminate coverage disparities across racial groups, age groups, 
and marital status. These reductions were partly attributable to both the Medicaid expansion and 
nationwide components of the law. 
Other studies in the literature focus solely on the ACA’s Medicaid expansion, using 
difference-in-differences (DD) models to compare changes in coverage over time between 
Medicaid expansion and non-expansion states. Wehby and Lyu (2018) include two years of post-
ACA data (2014-2015) from the ACS and show that the Medicaid expansion reduced but did not 
eliminate the coverage disparity across age and racial groups. Conversely, Yue et al. (2019) find 
that the ACA Medicaid expansion led to smaller gains among low-income Hispanics than other 
low-income individuals, implying a widened disparity. Kaestner et al. (2017) and Wherry and 
Miller (2016) provide evidence that the ACA Medicaid expansion increased insurance coverage 
among those with low incomes or levels of education, implying reduced socioeconomic 
disparities in coverage. Benitez et al. (2018) focuses on Kentucky, finding that much of the 
 
 
reduction in the uninsured rate is due to large coverage gains from areas with higher 
concentrations of poverty. 
 We contribute to this literature by using the DDD method described above and elsewhere 
(Courtemanche et al., 2018b) to uncover the causal impact of the 2014 ACA provisions, both 
with and without the Medicaid expansion, on coverage disparities after four years. To the best of 
our knowledge we are the first to include data from 2017 in such an analysis. Given the 
uncertainty surrounding the future of the ACA, new evidence regarding the impact of the ACA 
provided by each new year of survey data is extremely valuable to researchers and policy 
makers. As in Courtemanche et al. (2019b), we evaluate changes in coverage disparities by 
stratifying our sample by income, race/ethnicity, marital status, age, gender, and geography. We 
use data from the American Community Survey (ACS) between 2011 and 2017. The ACS is 
commonly used in the literature because it includes multiple categories of insurance coverage, 
allowing us to evaluate how the ACA affected coverage disparities via changes to both private 
(Marketplace) and public (Medicaid) coverage. The ACS includes approximately 3,000,000 
observations per year and relatively narrow geographic identifiers, allowing us to precisely 
estimate the effects for states and many local areas. A final benefit is that the mandatory nature 
of the ACS reduces concerns about sample selection amongst respondents.  
 After four years, our results suggest that the fully implemented ACA eliminated 44 
percent of the coverage gap across income groups, with the Medicaid expansion accounting for 
this entire reduction. The ACA also reduced coverage disparities across racial groups by 26.7 
percent, across marital status by 45 percent, and across age groups by 44 percent, with these 
changes being partly attributable to both the Medicaid expansion and nationwide components of 
the law. 
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DATA 
We use data from the American Community Survey’s (ACS) 2011 through 2017 survey 
waves. The ACS is a nationwide mandatory random survey across all 50 states and the District 
of Columbia that samples about one percent of the U.S. population annually. Each year of the 
survey results in about 3,000,000 individual responses per year.1 The mandatory feature of the 
survey reduces concerns about sample selection amongst respondents. For this study, we restrict 
the ACS sample to respondents aged 19 to 64 because the ACA was not intended to affect the 
health coverage of children or those older than 64. We limit the first sample year to 2011 to only 
isolate the effects of the 2014 provisions of the ACA, and thereby avoid capturing the effect of 
earlier changes in the insurance market, such as the 2010 dependent coverage mandate that 
allowed dependents to remain on their parent’s insurance plan until their 26th birthday.  
The ACS includes geographic identifiers for each survey respondent. In addition to state 
identifiers, the ACS identifies smaller geographic areas called Public Use Microdata Areas 
(PUMAs), which represent approximately 2,300 areas of at least 100,000 people nested entirely 
within a state.2 The granularity of the  PUMA identifier is important for our study since a PUMA 
can better represent local characteristics than a state identifier.   
To detect a causal impact of the ACA marketplace component of the ACA, we utilize 
local within-state variation in uninsured rates in 2013. Ideally, we would use the within state 
PUMA identifier to measure uninsured rates, however, the PUMA definitions changed, new 
boundaries were introduced in the 2010 Census, and the new boundaries were applied to the 
2013 ACS wave and later. This complicates our analysis as we cannot identify the same 
                                                            
1 The survey can be completed online or by mailing in a paper questionnaire. In-person interviews are done with 
respondents in group quarters. See https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/programs-
surveys/acs/about/ACS_Information_Guide.pdf  
2 For more information, see: https://www.census.gov/geo/reference/puma.html  
 
 
geographic region across time before and after the 2014 ACA components. We address this 
problem by following Courtemanche et al. (2017) and identifying core-based statistical areas 
(CBSAs) using the old and new PUMA classification systems. Some CBSAs span multiple states 
and we isolate the portion of the CBSA in each state as separate local areas. In other cases, 
CBSAs do not cover all areas within a state, and we create additional local areas for the non-
CBSA portion in each state. These adjustments avoid dropping respondents from the sample 
living in multistate CBSAs or areas that are not part of a CBSA. Our dataset consists of 630 local 
CBSA and non-CBSA areas that each contain between 356 and 78,781 ACS respondents in 
2013, with a median of 1,020 and a mean of 2,811 respondents. This implies that our pre-ACA 
uninsured rates are computed from a reasonably large sample in each local area. 
The ACS collects a large number of socio-demographic characteristics relevant to 
execute our study and it includes a question on health insurance coverage that allows us to 
evaluate how the ACA affected both private and public coverage. The ACS asks each individual 
“Is this person CURRENTLY covered by any of the following types of health insurance or 
health coverage plans?” and respondents select from eight types of health insurance categories; 
“insurance though a current or former employer or union”, “insurance purchased directly from an 
insurance company”, “Medicare”, “Medicaid, Medical Assistance, or any kind of government-
assistance plan for those with low incomes or a disability”, “TRICARE or other military health 
care”, “VA (including those who have ever used or enrolled for VA health care)”, “Indian Health 
Service”, and “any other type of health insurance or health coverage plan.”3 Respondents can 
choose more than one type of insurance coverage and we classify only those answering “no” to 
all eight categories as uninsured. We create six binary outcome variables based on the ACS 
                                                            
3 See, for example, http://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/methodology/questionnaires/2014/quest14.pdf  
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insurance coverage question: any insurance, any private insurance (either employer sponsored or 
directly purchased), employer-sponsored insurance, directly purchased insurance, Medicaid, and 
any other coverage (defined as coverage as neither private nor Medicaid coverage). These 
categories are not mutually exclusive due to the possibility of multiple sources of coverage.  
Additionally, the ACS collects information on age, gender, race/ethnicity, origin, family 
structure, education, labor force participation, and household income. We use this information to 
create a large number of control variables. Specifically, we create dummy variables for the age 
of the respondent (binary indicators for each year from 19 to 64), female, race/ethnicity (non-
Hispanic white, non-Hispanic black, Hispanic, and other race/ethnicity), foreign born, and U.S. 
citizenship status. We generate from the family structure responses a binary variable indicating 
whether the individual is married and separate indicators counting the number of children under 
the age of 18 living in the household (one, two, three, four, and five or more). We create separate 
binary indicators for the highest level of completed education (less than a high school degree, 
high school degree, some college, and college graduate), and we measure labor force outcomes 
with binary variable indicating whether the individual is a student or not, whether the individual 
is unemployed or not, and with the continuous Bureau of Labor Statistics’ annual state 
unemployment rate. Lastly, we measure household income by first transforming the income 
information into percentages relative to the Federal Poverty Limit (FPL), and then create 50 
dummies measuring the separate impact for each 10-point increment of income as a percentage 
of the FPL (with the highest category including everyone over 500 percent). 
We add to the ACS state-level ACA variables from the Kaiser Family Foundation. 
Specifically, we include binary variables on whether a state implemented a Medicaid expansion 
via the ACA. The majority of states expanded Medicaid effective January 1, 2014, but several 
 
 
states expanded at a later time. At the end of 2017, 32 states expanded their Medicaid program 
and 25 states expanded Medicaid as of January 1, 2014. Seven states expanded at a later time - 
Michigan (expansion effective date 4/1/2014), New Hampshire (8/15/2014), Pennsylvania 
(1/1/2015), Indiana (2/1/2015), Alaska (9/1/2015), Montana (1/1/2016), and Louisiana 
(7/1/2016).  
Finally, we also collect information from the Kaiser Family Foundation regarding the 
functionality of the 2014 ACA insurance marketplaces. We include dummy variables indicating 
whether a state set up their own private insurance exchange (as opposed to using the federal 
exchange) and whether the exchange experienced glitches. These variables speak to aspects that 
may be related to frictions of outreach and sign-up of the uninsured to Marketplace insurance 
plans, as well as concerns that these decisions may be correlated with the decision to expand 
Medicaid coverage.  
Table 1 provides pretreatment means and standard deviations for the insurance coverage 
outcomes of interest, while table A1 does the same for the controls. We also stratify the sample 
into four groups based on whether the respondent’s state expanded Medicaid and whether her 
local area’s pretreatment uninsured rate was above or below the sample median. Table 1 shows 
that in the baseline year of 2013 79 percent of the sample was enrolled in some type of coverage, 
including 11 percent with Medicaid and 60 percent with employer-provided coverage. For both 
the high-uninsured (columns 2 and 4) and low-uninsured (columns 3 and 5) rate subgroups, 
individuals in Medicaid expansion states were slightly more likely to be covered in 2013 than 
those in non-expansion states, with the differences being driven entirely by Medicaid coverage. 
Our DDD model described in the next section will account for such baseline differences. Figure 
1 presents changes in our coverage measures between 2011 and 2017, stratified into the same 
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four groups. With six coverage outcomes and four groups, there are a total of 24 lines given in 
figure 1. In general, the pre-ACA trends in the figure do not appear to differ meaningfully by 
state Medicaid expansion status or local area pre-ACA uninsured rate category. This provides 
preliminary justification for our use of the pre-ACA uninsured rate and Medicaid expansion 
variables as sources of identification in our analysis. Figure 1 shows that the probabilities of 
having any coverage, privately purchased coverage, any private coverage, and Medicaid 
increased in 2014 and generally continued to grow over time. One exception is the dip in 
individually purchased coverage observed in 2017. 
 
METHODS 
Our empirical methodology follows several prior studies that aimed to separately identify 
the impacts of both the Medicaid and private components of the ACA (Courtemanche et al., 
2017; 2018a; 2018b; 2019a; 2019b; 2019c). Specifically, we estimate DDD models where the 
three “differences” are before versus after the ACA’s implementation, whether or not the state 
participated in the ACA’s Medicaid expansion, and the “dose” of the treatment, as measured by 
the local area’s pre-ACA uninsured rate. The model, estimated for both the full sample and 
various subsamples, takes the following form:  
 
𝐼௜௔௦௧ ൌ 𝛽଴ ൅ 𝛽ଵሺ𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝐷௔௦ ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇௧ሻ ൅ 𝛽ଶሺ𝑀𝐸𝐷𝐼𝐶𝐴𝐼𝐷௦ ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇௧ሻ ൅ 
𝛽ଷሺ𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝐷௔௦ ∗ 𝑀𝐸𝐷𝐼𝐶𝐴𝐼𝐷௦ ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇௧ሻ ൅ 𝛽ସ𝑿𝒊𝒂𝒔𝒕 ൅ 𝜏௧ ൅ 𝛼௔௦ ൅ 𝜀௜௔௦௧.   
(1) 
 
𝐼௜௔௦௧ is a binary variable for whether individual i living in local area a within state s has insurance 
coverage in year t. 𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝐷௔௦ is the 2013 baseline (pre-treatment) uninsured rate in local 
 
 
area a in state s, 𝑀𝐸𝐷𝐼𝐶𝐴𝐼𝐷௦ and 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇௧ are indicators for whether state s participated in the 
ACA’s Medicaid expansion and whether or not year t is after the ACA’s implementation (2014 
or later), respectively.4 𝑿𝒊𝒂𝒔𝒕 is a vector of the aforementioned control variables, while 𝜏௧ and 
𝛼௔௦ are year and local area fixed effects and 𝜀௜௔௦௧ is the error term. Note that we do not 
separately include 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇௧, 𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝐷௔௦, 𝑀𝐸𝐷𝐼𝐶𝐴𝐼𝐷௦, or 𝑀𝐸𝐷𝐼𝐶𝐴𝐼𝐷௦ ∗ 𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝐷௔௦ 
since these terms are subsumed by the time and local area fixed effects.  
Following the prior studies listed above, we consider 𝛾ଵ * 𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝐷௔௦ to represent 
the impact of the ACA in areas without the Medicaid expansion – in other words, the impact of 
its private portion. This implicitly assumes that an area with a 0 percent uninsured rate is 
untreated by the ACA, meaning that 𝛾ଶ is considered to capture unobserved state-by-time 
confounders. Accordingly, the effect of the Medicaid expansion is also assumed to be 
proportional to the baseline uninsured rate in expansion states: 𝛾ଷ ∗ 𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝐷௔௦ ∗
𝑀𝐸𝐷𝐼𝐶𝐴𝐼𝐷௦௧. The full effect of the ACA in Medicaid expansion states is therefore 
𝛾ଵ * 𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝐷௔௦ ൅ 𝛾ଷ ∗ 𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝐷௔௦. The predicted effect of the ACA at the sample 
mean baseline uninsured rate is 𝛾ଵ * 𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝐷௔௦തതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതത in states that refused the Medicaid 
expansion and 𝛾ଵ * 𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝐷௔௦തതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതത ൅ 𝛾ଷ ∗ 𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝐷௔௦തതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതത in Medicaid expansion states. The 
baseline uninsured rate for each subsample is re-computed using only respondents in that 
particular subsample. 
 
RESULTS 
                                                            
4 For states that expanded Medicaid later than 2014, we adjust the timing of the “post” period in the 𝑀𝐸𝐷𝐼𝐶𝐴𝐼𝐷௦ ∗𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇௧ and 𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝐷௔௦ ∗ 𝑀𝐸𝐷𝐼𝐶𝐴𝐼𝐷௦ ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇௧ interactions accordingly.  
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Table 2 reports the implied effects of the ACA at the average pre-ACA uninsured rate for 
the full non-elderly adult sample based on coefficient estimates from the DDD regression 
described by equation (1). The first column shows results for any coverage, while the next five 
columns show the effects on different sources of coverage. The first row reports the pre-ACA 
uninsured rate. Indicators of statistical significance are given at the 0.1 percent, 1 percent, and 5 
percent level. For each regression we separately report: a) the implied effects of the Medicaid 
expansion alone and b) the fully implemented ACA, which includes the Medicaid expansion as 
well as the other main components of the ACA, such as subsidized Marketplace coverage. This 
approach allows for easier comparison to previous work that focused on the Medicaid expansion 
alone.  
The first column of table 2 suggests that at the average pre-ACA uninsured rate of 20.3 
percent, the Medicaid expansion increased the proportion of residents with insurance coverage 
by 5.1 percentage points over the four-year period of 2014-2017. In comparison, the fully 
implemented ACA led to an 8.7 percentage point increase in coverage, implying that the package 
of nationwide reforms contributed the remaining 3.6 percentage points. The remaining columns 
examine sources of coverage, where we consider any source of private coverage, any employer- 
sponsored (ESI) plan, any individually purchased plan, Medicaid, and any other coverage source. 
Our results suggest that, in an area with the mean pre-ACA uninsured rate, the fully implemented 
ACA increases private coverage by 2.8 percentage points. This is driven by increases in both ESI 
(1.8 percentage points) and individually purchased coverage (1 percentage point). The full ACA 
increased Medicaid coverage by 6.2 percentage points, most of which comes from the Medicaid 
expansion component of the law (5.9 percentage points). For the full sample, the Medicaid 
expansion alone statistically significantly affects the probability of having Medicaid only. The 
 
 
full ACA with the Medicaid expansion, on the other hand, has a statistically significant positive 
effect on having any private insurance, ESI, as well as individually purchased insurance.  
The validity of the identifying assumptions of our baseline DDD model cannot be 
directly tested. We test the validity of these assumptions indirectly by reporting the pre-ACA 
coefficients from an event study model where the treatment variables are interacted with the full 
set of year fixed effects. We report the results from this event study analysis separately in tables 
3 and 4. Table 3 reports only the estimated pre-treatment (2011 and 2012) coefficients from the 
event study, while table 4 reports only the post-treatment implied effects (separately for the years 
2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017). This split allows us to focus on the indirect test of our identifying 
assumptions in table 3 and decomposing the year-by-year effects of the ACA in the post-period 
in table 4. With that in mind, we start by examining the results from table 3. Unlike in table 2, 
the numbers in table 3 are not implied effects but estimated coefficients taken directly from the 
event study regressions. Here we would expect around 5 percent of the pre-treatment coefficients 
to be significant by chance. A substantially higher percentage of significant results in the pre-
period will call our identification strategy into question. We see that 2 out of 24 coefficients (8.3 
percent) are significant in table 3, which gives us confidence in a casual interpretation of our 
results.  
Table 4 reports the implied effect of the ACA at mean pre-reform uninsured rate of 20.3 
percent in an event study specification where the treatment variables are interacted with the full 
set of year fixed effects. As mentioned above, this table reports only the post-treatment implied 
effects (for the years 2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017) from the same event study model that 
generates the results reported in table 3. The table includes indicators at the .1 percent, 1 percent, 
and 5 percent significance level to show if the estimates are statistically significantly different 
 13 
 
between the first and last post-years (i.e. 2014 vs. 2017) and between 2016 vs. 2017 as well. 
Three sets of implied effects are reported in table 4: the impact of the ACA without the Medicaid 
expansion in panel I, the impact of the Medicaid expansion alone in panel II, and the impact of 
the full ACA with the Medicaid expansion (which is the sum of the first two effects) in panel III. 
This table essentially shows how the effect of the ACA changed over time.  
The first column in panel I shows that the effect of the ACA without the Medicaid 
expansion on having any insurance increased year over year in the post-reform period until 2016 
and then decreased in 2017. The first column in panel II shows that the Medicaid expansion 
alone led to an increased probability of having any insurance year over year in all four post-
reform years. The combination of these two facts leads to an increased probability of having any 
insurance as a result of the fully implemented ACA year over year until 2016 and a plateau in the 
probability of having any insurance between 2016 and 2017 (see the first column in panel III). 
To give a sense of the magnitude of these changes, the probability of having any insurance due 
the to the fully implemented ACA increased from 6.1 percentage points in 2014 to 10.7 
percentage points in 2016. Instead of growing further in 2017, we see an increase in the 
probability of having any insurance due to the fully implemented ACA of only 10.6 percentage 
points in 2017, which is not statistically significantly different than the 2016 estimate.  
Looking at the sources of insurance in panel I, we see an increase in any private coverage 
year over year due to the ACA without the Medicaid expansion until 2016 (2.8, 4.5 and 4.7 
percentage points for 2014, 2015 and 2016 respectively compared to pre-ACA coverage) and a 
decrease in coverage growth in 2017 (only a 3.5 percentage point increase in 2017). This change 
in any private coverage appears to be driving the overall change in coverage due to the ACA 
without the Medicaid expansion (which increases by 2.9, 4.6, 4.8, and 3.6 percentage points for 
 
 
2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017 respectively compared to pre-ACA coverage). Turning to the 
sources of insurance in panel II, Medicaid coverage increases year over year in the post-reform 
period due to the Medicaid expansion from 3.3 percentage points in 2014 to 8 percentage points 
in 2017. As expected, this change in Medicaid coverage appears to be driving the overall change 
in coverage due to the Medicaid expansion (which increases by 3.2, 4.7, 5.9 and 7 percentage 
points in 2014, 2015, 2016 and 2017 respectively compared to pre-ACA coverage). 
As mentioned above, panel III in table 4 shows that between 2016 and 2017 there was a 
plateau in the growth in “any insurance” due to full implementation of the ACA (an increase of 
10.7 percentage points in 2016 and 10.6 percentage points in 2017 as compared to the pre-ACA 
period). From the sources of insurance columns, we see that this was the result of continued 
increasing growth in Medicaid coverage over each of the post-period years (3.5, 6.6, 7.9 and 8.4 
percentage point increase in coverage in 2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017) and growth in private 
insurance coverage in 2014 and 2015, followed by a plateau and a reduction in the growth of 
coverage from 2015 to 2017 (2.8, 3.2, 3.2 and 2.6 percentage point increase in coverage in 2014, 
2015, 2016, and 2017).  
Tables 5, 6, and 7 report the implied effects of the Medicaid expansion and the fully 
implemented ACA for various subsamples of interest at the mean pre-ACA uninsured rates for 
each of those subsamples. Like table 2, these tables report the implied effects of Medicaid 
expansion alone and full ACA following the DDD design in equation 1. The first rows for each 
subsample show the pre-ACA uninsured rate for that subsample, which we use to calculate the 
pre-ACA disparities in coverage. The two panels of table 5 stratify the sample into subsamples 
by income and race. Since each subsample must contain enough 2013 respondents to accurately 
compute local area uninsured rates, we are limited to a maximum of two or three subsamples per 
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stratification, as in Courtemanche et al. (2019b). For income, we consider three categories: those 
with income under 138 percent of the FPL, those between 138 and 400 percent, and those above 
400 percent. The under 138 percent of the FPL group was made eligible for Medicaid in states 
that expanded their Medicaid programs via the ACA. Additionally, those between 100 and 138 
percent of the FPL were eligible for subsidized Marketplace coverage in non-expansion states. 
Those between 138 and 400 percent of the FPL were made eligible for subsidized Marketplace 
coverage in all states. The highest income group (above 400 percent of the FPL) was also able to 
purchase non-subsidized Marketplace coverage in all states. The uninsured rate for those in the 
highest income group in 2013 was 6.7 percent, while it was 39.5 percent for the lowest income 
group. This implies a 32.8 percentage point coverage gap between the low and high income 
group.  
According to the first column of table 5, panel I, this 32.8 percentage point coverage gap 
was reduced by 17.4 percentage points (= 18.4 percentage point reduction for the lowest income 
group – 1 percentage point reduction for the highest income group) due to the Medicaid 
expansion. This represents a 53 percent reduction in the coverage gap between the low and high 
income groups. The fully implemented ACA, which includes the Medicaid expansion, but also 
influences the coverage of higher income individuals through the national components of the 
ACA, reduced the low-income coverage gap by 44 percent. Turning to sources of coverage, 
several results emerge. First, the coverage gains among the low income occurred completely 
through Medicaid coverage in expansion states. Moreover, some of the coverage expansion 
among middle income individuals occurred via Medicaid coverage even though this income 
range was not eligible for coverage via the Medicaid expansion. Courtemanche, Marton, and 
Yelowitz (2019) further document this phenomenon. 
 
 
We next examine the race stratification in panel II of table 5. The racial coverage gap in 
2013 was 16.1 percentage points, with non-whites having an uninsured rate of 30.6 percent, 
while non-Hispanic whites had an uninsured rate of 14.5 percent. Our results suggest that the 
Medicaid expansion reduced the 16.1 percentage point coverage gap by 2.4 percentage points 
(15 percent), while the fully implemented ACA reduced the gap by 4.3 percentage points (26.7 
percent). The results for sources of coverage show that the non-whites enjoy larger gains across-
the-board, i.e., the effects of the full ACA on all types of coverage are larger for non-whites 
compared to whites.  
Panel I of table 6 examines disparities of coverage by marital status. In 2013 unmarried 
individuals had a 27.2 percent uninsured rate, while married individuals had a 14.1 percent 
uninsured rate giving rise to a 13.1 percentage point coverage gap between the two groups. This 
unmarried coverage gap was reduced by 5.3 percentage points (40.5 percent) by the Medicaid 
expansion, while the fully implemented ACA reduced this coverage gap by 5.9 percentage points 
(45 percent). The shrinking gap is attributable to larger gains in ESI and Medicaid coverage 
among the unmarried.  
Panel II of table 6 splits the sample into four age groups: 19-26 years of age, 27-34 years 
of age, 35-49 years of age, and 50-64 years of age. The rationale for separating 19-26 year olds 
from 27-34 year olds is that the former was previously affected by the 2010 dependent coverage 
mandate. Because of the mandate, it is possible that the effect of the 2014 ACA provisions could 
be weaker among 19-26 than 27-34 year olds. The data, however, shows that those aged 19-26 
years still had the highest uninsured rate (27 percent) among the age groups in 2013, three years 
after the dependent coverage mandate took effect. Those aged 50-64 had the lowest uninsured 
rate of 14.5 percent. This implies a young adult coverage gap of 12.5 percentage points. The 
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Medicaid expansion reduced this coverage gap by 4.6 percentage points (36.8 percent) and the 
fully implemented ACA reduced it by 5.5 percentage points (44 percent). The larger gain among 
19-26 year olds is driven by a much larger increase in Medicaid coverage (9.7 percentage points 
compared to 4.3 percentage points among 50-64 year olds due to the full ACA). 
Panel I of table 7 stratifies the sample by gender. Prior to the ACA, we observe a 
relatively small coverage gap of 3.7 percentage point for men (22.3 percent uninsured rate for 
males vs. 18.6 percent for females). Our results suggest that the Medicaid expansion actually 
increased the size of this coverage gap by 24.3 percent since it reduced the uninsured rate for 
women by a greater degree than it did for men. Conversely, the fully implemented ACA reduced 
the size of the gender coverage gap by 5.4 percent due to a larger effect of full ACA on private 
coverage for men as compared to women. 
Panel II of table 7 stratifies the sample by urban vs. rural location. When it comes to 
health care access, rural individuals are generally considered a vulnerable population. The 
uninsured rate in 2013 was 21.1 percent for rural non-elderly adults as compared to 20.3 percent 
for urban non-elderly adults. So the initial disparity in terms of insurance coverage was 0.8 
percentage points. The fully implemented ACA reduced this disparity by 2.1 percentage points 
whereas the Medicaid expansion alone led to a 2.7 percentage point reduction in the rural 
coverage gap. An increase in ESI coverage for urban individuals led to a lower net effect of the 
fully implemented ACA on the rural coverage gap as compared to the Medicaid expansion alone.   
 
DISCUSSION 
Prior to the main implementation of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) in 2014, there were 
well- documented disparities in insurance coverage along multiple dimensions, such as age, race, 
 
 
and income (Courtemanche, Marton, and Yelowitz, 2016; Yelowitz, 2016; Courtemanche et al., 
2019b). In this paper, we investigate whether newly available calendar year 2017 data from the 
ACS helps to provide further insights into the ACA’s effects on insurance disparities.  
There are three main overall findings of our investigation. First, there were further 
reductions in coverage disparities in 2017. After four years, the fully implemented ACA reduced 
coverage disparities across income groups by 44 percent, racial groups by 27 percent, and across 
age groups by 44 percent. These results are larger than the ones estimated by Courtemanche et 
al., (2019b) using only three years of post-implementation data. We also confirm their finding 
that the ACA reversed the small rural coverage gap that existed prior to the implementation of 
the ACA. In addition, reductions in the size of the gender coverage gap emerged that were not 
present when using only three years of post-implementation data. This reduction is due to the 
larger effect of the private components of the ACA expansion on insurance coverage for men 
than women.  Finally, the reductions in coverage disparities across marital status were slightly 
smaller with four years of post-implementation data than the ones obtained with only three years 
(44 percent versus 45 percent, respectively). 
Second, the gains in insurance coverage growth slowed down in 2017 due to a reduction 
in the growth of private insurance coverage, most of which is due to a reduction in ESI coverage, 
but also due to a reduction in the growth of individually purchased coverage. Even though we 
don’t have enough data to understand the mechanisms driving this change, it is possible that the 
2016 presidential election had a chilling effect on private insurance. In January 2017, President 
Trump signed his first executive order directing federal agencies to exercise all authority and 
discretion available to them to waive, defer, grant exemptions from, or delay the implementation 
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of any provision or requirement of the ACA. Whether this and other actions taken by President 
Trump had an effect on private insurance coverage is a topic that needs further investigation. 
Third, our results show that the reductions in coverage disparities are due to both the 
Medicaid expansion and to the private components of the ACA. Reductions in the growth of 
private insurance coverage could dampen the reductions in coverage disparities. For example, the 
reduction in coverage disparities across income groups was larger using four years of data 
compared to using three years of data, but only slightly (44 percent versus 43 percent, 
respectively). Similarly, the slight reduction in the coverage disparity by marital status in 2017 is 
due to a smaller increase in private insurance coverage – particularly individually purchased 
insurance – among unmarried individuals.   
One limitation of our work is that our disparity analyses assume that the subsamples are 
exogenously determined. Income is one source of stratification that might seem particularly 
likely to adjust endogenously in response to the 2014 ACA provisions. Kaestner et al. (2017) and 
Leung and Mas (2018) found little impact of the ACA Medicaid expansions on work effort, 
implying that the effect on income should be minimal. Gooptu et al. (2016) found no impact of 
the ACA in part‐time versus full‐time employment or job reductions in 2014. Duggan et al. 
(2017), on the other hand, found that while labor market outcomes in the aggregate were not 
significantly affected by the ACA, labor force participation reductions in areas with higher 
potential exchange enrollment were offset by increases in labor force participation in areas with 
higher potential Medicaid enrollment.  
Our results are broadly consistent with those reported in the Medicaid expansion 
literature in that both the Medicaid expansion and the fully implemented ACA generally reduce 
but do not eliminate coverage disparities. These results imply that full repeal of the ACA would 
 
 
exacerbate these disparities. Additionally, it is possible that changes to the ACA after 2017, 
including regulatory changes, such as Medicaid work requirements, and the elimination of the 
individual mandate, would lead to further changes in disparities. For example, our finding that 
the Medicaid expansion eliminated 53 percent of the coverage gap across income groups may 
change if Medicaid work requirements are widely implemented and end up reducing enrollment. 
Thus, more work is needed to examine the impact of the ACA as economic conditions change 
and the ACA itself changes. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Insurance Coverage 
Full sample 
Medicaid 
expansion;  
at or above 
median 
baseline 
uninsured 
Medicaid 
expansion; 
below 
median 
baseline 
uninsured 
Non-
expansion; at 
or above 
median 
baseline 
uninsured 
Non-
expansion; 
below 
median 
baseline 
uninsured 
Any insurance 
coverage 
0.792 (0.406) 0.748 (0.434) 0.849 (0.358) 0.727 (0.446) 0.829 (0.376) 
Any private 0.668 (0.471) 0.618 (0.486) 0.721 (0.449) 0.609 (0.488) 0.717 (0.450) 
Employer-sponsored 0.598 (0.490) 0.545 (0.498) 0.651 (0.477) 0.542 (0.498) 0.644 (0.479) 
Individually purchased 0.094 (0.292) 0.095 (0.293) 0.094 (0.292) 0.089 (0.285) 0.100 (0.299) 
Medicaid 0.106 (0.307) 0.114 (0.318) 0.121 (0.325) 0.089 (0.285) 0.080 (0.271) 
Other  0.032 (0.176) 0.030 (0.172) 0.024 (0.152) 0.041 (0.198) 0.043 (0.203) 
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
Table 2. Implied Effects of the ACA at Mean Pre-Treatment Uninsured Rate for Full 
Sample  
Any 
insurance 
Any 
private 
Employer-
sponsored 
Individually 
purchased 
Medicaid Other 
Non-elderly adults aged 19-64 (pre-treatment uninsured rate=0.203, sample size=12,313,971) 
      Medicaid    
      Expansion 
0.051*** 
(0.012) 
-0.007 
(0.011) 
0.010 
(0.007) 
-0.017
(0.014) 
0.059*** 
(0.008) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
      Full ACA (w/ 
      Medicaid) 
0.087*** 
(0.006) 
0.028*** 
(0.006) 
0.018*** 
(0.005) 
0.010** 
(0.003) 
0.062*** 
(0.007) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
Notes: Results are effects of the ACA on the proportion of residents with the specified type of insurance, evaluated 
at the mean pre-treatment uninsured rate. Standard errors, heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered by state, are in 
parentheses. *** indicates statistically significant at 0.1% level; ** 1% level; * 5% level. Sampling weights are 
used. All regressions include area and time fixed effects and the full set of controls.  
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Table 3. Event Study Results for Full Sample – Pre-Reform Coefficients 
Any 
insurance 
Any 
private 
Employer-
sponsored 
Individually 
purchased 
Medicaid Other 
PANEL I: FULL SAMPLE 
Non-elderly adults aged 19-64 (pre-treatment uninsured rate=0.203, sample size=12,313,971) 
  Unin. Rate* 
  Med. Exp.*2011  
0.030 
(0.030) 
-0.0187 
(0.036) 
-0.018 
(0.037) 
-0.025 
(0.020) 
0.039 
(0.027) 
0.005 
(0.010) 
  Unin. Rate* 
  Med. Exp.*2012 
-0.021
(0.039)
-0.009
(0.034)
-0.012
(0.028)
-0.008
(0.026)
-0.007
(0.015)
-0.007
(0.005)
  Uninsured 
  Rate*2011 
0.010 
(0.023)
0.031 
(0.032)
0.008 
(0.032)
0.040** 
(0.014)
-0.008
(0.016)
-0.005
(0.008)
  Uninsured 
  Rate*2012 
0.043 
(0.033) 
0.037 
(0.030) 
0.008 
(0.024) 
0.046*** 
(0.013) 
0.010 
(0.009) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
Notes: Coefficient estimates are shown. Standard errors, heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered by state, are in 
parentheses. *** indicates statistically significant at 0.1% level; ** 1% level; * 5% level. Sampling weights are 
used. All regressions include area and time fixed effects, the full set of controls, Medicaid Expansion*2011, and 
Medicaid Expansion*2012. 
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Table 4. Event Study Results for Full Sample – Post-Reform Implied Effects 
Any 
insurance 
Any 
private 
Employer-
sponsored 
Individually 
purchased 
Medicaid Other 
Non-elderly adults aged 19-64 (pre-treatment uninsured rate=0.203) 
PANEL I: ACA without Medicaid Expansion 
ACA w/o Medicaid 
Expansion 2014 (A) 
0.029*** 
(0.009) 
0.028*** 
(0.008) 
0.011*** 
(0.002) 
0.019 
(0.010) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.001
(0.001)
ACA w/o Medicaid 
Expansion 2015 (A) 
0.046** 
(0.016) 
0.045** 
(0.013) 
0.010 
(0.004) 
0.036* 
(0.017) 
0.004 
(0.005) 
-0.0002
(0.001)
ACA w/o Medicaid 
Expansion 2016 (A) 
0.048** 
(0.018) 
0.047** 
(0.014) 
0.010*** 
(0.003) 
0.038* 
(0.016) 
0.004 
(0.006) 
-0.001
(0.002)
ACA w/o Medicaid 
Expansion 2017 (A) 
0.036* 
(0.017)γγγ 
0.035* 
(0.015) γγγ 
0.003 
(0.003) †† γγ 
0.036* 
(0.017) †† 
0.004 
(0.004) 
-0.001
(0.002)
PANEL II: Medicaid Expansion 
Medicaid Expansion 2014 
(B) 
0.032** 
(0.010) 
-0.001
(0.009)
0.007 
(0.004) 
-0.008
(0.010)
0.033*** 
(0.007) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
Medicaid Expansion 2015 
(B) 
0.047** 
(0.016) 
-0.013
(0.015)
0.005 
(0.006) 
-0.020
(0.017)
0.062*** 
(0.009) 
-0.0001
(0.002)
Medicaid Expansion 2016 
(B) 
0.059** 
(0.018) 
-0.015
(0.016)
0.009 
(0.006) 
-0.025
(0.016)
0.075*** 
(0.010) 
0.001
(0.002)
Medicaid Expansion 2017 
(B) 
0.070*** 
(0.018) ††† γγγ 
-0.009
(0.016)
0.011 
(0.009) 
-0.024
(0.017)
0.080*** 
(0.009)††† 
0.002
(0.002)
PANEL III: Full ACA 
Full ACA 2014 (A+B) 0.061*** 
(0.004) 
0.028*** 
(.005) 
.018*** 
(.004) 
0.010*** 
(0.003) 
0.035*** 
(0.006) 
-0.0000
(0.001)
Full ACA 2015 (A+B) 0.093*** 
(0.006) 
.032*** 
(.006) 
.015** 
(.004) 
0.016*** 
(0.003) 
0.066*** 
(0.008) 
-0.0003
(0.001) 
Full ACA 2016 (A+B) 0.107*** 
(0.005) 
.032*** 
(.007) 
.019** 
(.006) 
0.012*** 
(0.003) 
0.079*** 
(0.008) 
0.0001 
(0.002) 
Full ACA 2017 (A+B) 0.106*** 
(0.006)††† 
.026*** 
(.007) 
.014 
(.008) 
0.012** 
(0.004) 
0.084*** 
(0.007)††† 
0.001 
(0.001) 
Notes: Coefficient estimates are shown. Standard errors, heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered by state, are in 
parentheses. *** indicates statistically significant at 0.1% level; ** 1% level; * 5% level. Statistically significantly 
different effect in 2017 relative to 2014 is denoted by ††† at  0.1% level, †† at 1% level and † at 5% level. 
Statistically significantly different effect in 2017 relative to 2016 is denoted by γγγ at  0.1% level, γγ at 1% level 
and γ at 5% level. Sampling weights are used. All regressions include area and time fixed effects, the full set of 
controls. 
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Table 5. Implied Effects of the ACA at Mean Pre-Treatment Uninsured Rate for Income 
and Race Subsamples  
Any 
insurance 
Any 
private 
Employer-
sponsored 
Individually 
purchased 
Medicaid Other 
PANEL I: INCOME SUBSAMPLES 
Under 138% FPL (Pre-Treatment Uninsured Rate = 0.395, sample size = 2,237,808) 
      Medicaid    
      Expansion 
0.184*** 
(0.031) 
-0.015 
(0.016) 
0.004 
(0.017) 
-0.021 
(0.023) 
0.211*** 
(0.037) 
-0.002
(0.002)
      Full ACA (w/ 
      Medicaid) 
0.170*** 
(0.027) 
0.018 
(0.011) 
0.017 
(0.008) 
-0.001
(0.007)
0.153*** 
(0.032) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
138%-400% FPL (Pre-Treatment Uninsured Rate = 0.238, sample size = 4,814,696) 
      Medicaid    
      Expansion 
0.056*** 
(0.016) 
0.007 
(0.017) 
0.030 
(0.015) 
-0.020
(0.020) 
0.051*** 
(0.013) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
      Full ACA (w/ 
      Medicaid) 
0.106*** 
(0.012) 
0.062*** 
(0.013) 
0.050*** 
(0.011) 
0.014* 
(0.006) 
0.047*** 
(0.012) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
Over 400% FPL (Pre-Treatment Uninsured Rate = 0.067, sample size = 5,292,346) 
      Medicaid    
      Expansion 
0.010* 
(0.004) 
0.002 
(0.005) 
0.010 
(0.009) 
-0.012
(0.007) 
0.007 
(0.003) 
-0.001
(0.002)
      Full ACA (w/ 
      Medicaid) 
0.026*** 
(0.003) 
0.018*** 
(0.005) 
0.009 
(0.005) 
0.007* 
(0.003) 
0.007* 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
PANEL II: RACE / ETHNICITY SUBSAMPLES 
Non-Hispanic White (Pre-Treatment Uninsured Rate = 0.145, sample size = 8,336,484) 
       Medicaid    
       Expansion 
0.048*** 
(0.006) 
0.005 
(0.006) 
0.012 
(0.008) 
-0.007 
(0.008) 
0.047*** 
(0.008) 
-0.002
(0.001) 
       Full ACA (w/ 
       Medicaid) 
0.073*** 
(0.006) 
0.021*** 
(0.004) 
0.012** 
(0.004) 
0.007* 
(0.003) 
0.061*** 
(0.008) 
-0.003***
(0.001)
Non-White (Pre-Treatment Uninsured Rate = 0.306, sample size = 3,977,487) 
       Medicaid    
       Expansion 
0.072*** 
(0.021) 
-0.011 
(0.021) 
0.013 
(0.011) 
-0.021
(0.023) 
0.081*** 
(0.013) 
0.007**
(0.002)
       Full ACA (w/ 
       Medicaid) 
0.116*** 
(0.011) 
0.036*** 
(0.009) 
0.025** 
(0.009) 
0.014* 
(0.005) 
0.078*** 
(0.013) 
0.005**
(0.002)
Notes: Results are effects of the ACA on the proportion of residents with the specified type of insurance, evaluated 
at the mean pre-treatment uninsured rate. Standard errors, heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered by state, are in 
parentheses. *** indicates statistically significant at 0.1% level; ** 1% level; * 5% level. Sampling weights are 
used. All regressions include area and time fixed effects and the full set of controls.  
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Table 6. Implied Effects of the ACA at Mean Pre-Treatment Uninsured Rate for Marital 
Status and Age Subsamples  
Notes: Results are effects of the ACA on the proportion of residents with the specified type of insurance, evaluated 
at the mean pre-treatment uninsured rate. Standard errors, heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered by state, are in 
parentheses. *** indicates statistically significant at 0.1% level; ** 1% level; * 5% level. Sampling weights are 
used. All regressions include area and time fixed effects and the full set of controls.  
Any 
insurance 
Any 
private 
Employer-
sponsored 
Individually 
purchased 
Medicaid Other 
PANEL I: MARITAL STATUS SUBSAMPLES  
Married (Pre-Treatment Uninsured Rate = 0.141, sample size = 6,977,652) 
       Medicaid 
       Expansion 
0.031*** 
(0.008) 
-0.004 
(0.007) 
0.0003 
(0.004) 
-0.008
(0.008) 
0.037*** 
(0.005) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
       Full ACA (w/ 
       Medicaid) 
0.060*** 
(0.004) 
0.021*** 
(0.003) 
0.010*** 
(0.003) 
0.011*** 
(0.003) 
0.041*** 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
Unmarried (Pre-Treatment Uninsured Rate = 0.272, sample size = 5,336,319) 
       Medicaid 
       Expansion 
0.084*** 
(0.017) 
-0.004 
(0.015) 
0.019 
(0.011) 
-0.021
(0.015) 
0.090*** 
(0.012) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
       Full ACA (w/ 
       Medicaid) 
0.119*** 
(0.009) 
0.034*** 
(0.009) 
0.027*** 
(0.006) 
0.008 
(0.004) 
0.088*** 
(0.011) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
PANEL II: AGE SUBSAMPLES 
Ages 19-26 (pre-treatment uninsured rate = 0.270, sample size =  1,821,602 ) 
      Medicaid    
      Expansion 
0.077*** 
(0.016) 
-0.007 
(0.015) 
0.014 
(0.011) 
-0.017
(0.013) 
0.090*** 
(0.013) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
      Full ACA (w/ 
      Medicaid) 
0.123*** 
(0.010) 
0.029** 
(0.009) 
0.025** 
(0.008) 
0.006 
(0.004) 
0.097*** 
(0.013) 
0.003* 
(0.002) 
Ages 27-34 (pre-treatment uninsured rate = 0.250, sample size =  1,961,736 ) 
      Medicaid    
      Expansion 
0.057*** 
(0.012) 
-0.007 
(0.011) 
0.001 
(0.009) 
-0.007
(0.009) 
0.070*** 
(0.011) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
      Full ACA (w/ 
      Medicaid) 
0.094*** 
(0.009) 
0.020* 
(0.008) 
0.009 
(0.007) 
0.009* 
(0.003) 
0.078*** 
(0.009) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
Ages 35-49 (pre-treatment uninsured rate = 0.201, sample size = 3,885,153) 
      Medicaid    
      Expansion 
0.036** 
(0.012) 
-0.007
(0.011) 
0.006 
(0.006) 
-0.013
(0.012)
0.043*** 
(0.007) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
      Full ACA (w/ 
      Medicaid) 
0.074*** 
(0.005) 
0.028*** 
(0.005) 
0.019*** 
(0.005) 
0.009**
(0.003)
0.047*** 
(0.006) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
Ages 50-64 (pre-treatment uninsured rate = 0.145, sample size = 4,645,480) 
      Medicaid    
      Expansion 
0.031*** 
(0.008) 
-0.009 
(0.005) 
0.010 
(0.009) 
-0.019 
(0.012) 
0.043*** 
(0.005) 
-0.001
(0.002)
      Full ACA (w/ 
      Medicaid) 
0.068*** 
(0.005) 
0.029*** 
(0.004) 
0.015*** 
(0.003) 
0.013*** 
(0.003) 
0.043*** 
(0.004) 
-0.002
(0.001)
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Table 7. Implied Effects of the ACA at Mean Pre-Treatment Uninsured Rate for Gender 
and Rural/Urban Subsamples 
Any 
insurance 
Any 
private 
Employer-
sponsored 
Individually 
purchased 
Medicaid Other 
PANEL I: GENDER SUBSAMPLES 
Women (Pre-Treatment Uninsured Rate = 0.186, sample size = 6,389,974) 
       Medicaid    
       Expansion 
0.063*** 
(0.011) 
-0.002 
(0.009) 
0.012 
(0.011) 
-0.014
(0.013) 
0.067*** 
(0.013) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
       Full ACA (w/ 
       Medicaid) 
0.093*** 
(0.007) 
0.030*** 
(0.007) 
0.022*** 
(0.005) 
0.007 
(0.004) 
0.065*** 
(0.010) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
Men (Pre-Treatment Uninsured Rate = 0.223, sample size = 5,954,876) 
       Medicaid    
       Expansion 
0.054*** 
(0.013) 
-0.004 
(0.012) 
0.019 
(0.011) 
-0.020
(0.018) 
0.061*** 
(0.010) 
-0.001
(0.002)
       Full ACA (w/ 
       Medicaid) 
0.095*** 
(0.008) 
0.038*** 
(0.008) 
0.029*** 
(0.006) 
0.012* 
(0.005) 
0.061*** 
(0.010) 
-0.000
(0.002)
PANEL II: RURAL vs. URBAN SUBSAMPLES 
Rural (pre-treatment uninsured rate = 0.211, sample size = 2,282,428) 
       Medicaid    
       Expansion 
0.081*** 
(0.016) 
-0.004 
(0.013) 
-0.007
(0.011) 
0.005 
(0.011) 
0.087*** 
(0.022) 
-0.001
(0.004)
       Full ACA (w/ 
       Medicaid) 
0.111*** 
(0.015) 
0.026* 
(0.011) 
0.015 
(0.008) 
0.004 
(0.009) 
0.094*** 
(0.021) 
-0.004
(0.002)
Urban (pre-treatment uninsured rate = 0.203, sample size = 10,062,422) 
       Medicaid    
       Expansion 
0.054*** 
(0.012) 
-0.002 
(0.011) 
0.019 
(0.011) 
-0.019
(0.016) 
0.059*** 
(0.009) 
-0.001
(0.002)
       Full ACA (w/ 
       Medicaid) 
0.090*** 
(0.008) 
0.034*** 
(0.007) 
0.027*** 
(0.006) 
0.009* 
(0.004) 
0.058*** 
(0.009) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
Notes: Results are effects of the ACA on the proportion of residents with the specified type of insurance, 
evaluated at the mean pre-treatment uninsured rate. Standard errors, heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered by 
state, are in parentheses. *** indicates statistically significant at 0.1% level; ** 1% level; * 5% level. Sampling 
weights are used. All regressions include area and time fixed effects and the full set of controls. 
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Figure 1. Changes in Insurance Coverage Over Time 
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APPENDIX: 
Table A1. Pre-Treatment Summary Statistics for Control Variables 
Full 
Sample 
Medicaid 
Expansion; 
at or above 
Median 
Baseline 
Uninsured 
Medicaid 
Expansion; 
below 
Median 
Baseline 
Uninsured 
Non- 
Expansion; 
at or above 
Median 
Baseline 
Uninsured 
Non- 
Expansion; 
below 
Median 
Baseline 
Uninsured 
Demographic controls 
Age dummies (19-24 is omitted base category)a 
       Age 25-29 0.110 
(0.313) 
0.114 
(0.318) 
0.109 
(0.311) 
0.108 
(0.311) 
0.113 
(0.317) 
       Age 30-34 0.109 
(0.311) 
0.111 
(0.314) 
0.106 
(0.308) 
0.108 
(0.311) 
0.112 
(0.315) 
       Age 35-39 0.104 
(0.305) 
0.105 
(0.307) 
0.101 
(0.301) 
0.106 
(0.308) 
0.103 
(0.304) 
       Age 40-44 0.111 
(0.314) 
0.110 
(0.313) 
0.111 
(0.314) 
0.113 
(0.317) 
0.109 
(0.312) 
       Age 45-49 0.114 
(0.318) 
0.110 
(0.313) 
0.116 
(0.321) 
0.114 
(0.317) 
0.112 
(0.315) 
       Age 50-54 0.118 
(0.323) 
0.114 
(0.318) 
0.122 
(0.328) 
0.116 
(0.321) 
0.118 
(0.322) 
       Age 55-59 0.109 
(0.311) 
0.105 
(0.306) 
0.112 
(0.316) 
0.107 
(0.309) 
0.108 
(0.310) 
       Age 60-64 0.095 
(0.294) 
0.093 
(0.290) 
0.098 
(0.297) 
0.096 
(0.294) 
0.092 
(0.289) 
       Female 0.510 
(0.500) 
0.506 
(0.500) 
0.509 
(0.500) 
0.513 
(0.500) 
0.510 
(0.500) 
Race/ethnicity dummies (non-Hispanic white is omitted base category) 
      Non-Hispanic black 0.121 
(0.326) 
0.083 
(0.275) 
0.105 
(0.307) 
0.169 
(0.375) 
0.135 
(0.341) 
      Hispanic 0.163 
(0.369) 
0.272 
(0.445) 
0.107 
(0.310) 
0.198 
(0.399) 
0.071 
(0.256) 
      Other 0.080 
(0.271) 
0.101 
(0.301) 
0.095 
(0.293) 
0.051 
(0.221) 
0.053 
(0.227) 
Foreign born 0.171 
(0.376) 
0.230 
(0.421) 
0.168 
(0.374) 
0.162 
(0.369) 
0.093 
(0.291) 
US citizen 0.904 
(0.295) 
0.867 
(0.340) 
0.914 
(0.281) 
0.900 
(0.300) 
0.944 
(0.231) 
Married 0.520 
(0.500) 
0.508 
(0.500) 
0.518 
(0.500) 
0.521 
(0.500) 
0.544 
(0.498) 
Dummies for number of children in home (none is omitted base category) 
       One child 0.158 
(0.365) 
0.162 
(0.368) 
0.157 
(0.364) 
0.160 
(0.366) 
0.155 
(0.362) 
       Two children 0.133 0.135 0.133 0.130 0.134 
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(0.339) (0.341) (0.340) (0.336) (0.341) 
       Three children 0.052 
(0.223) 
0.057 
(0.233) 
0.049 
(0.215) 
0.053 
(0.224) 
0.054 
(0.227) 
       Four children 0.015 
(0.123) 
0.017 
(0.131) 
0.013 
(0.115) 
0.016 
(0.124) 
0.018 
(0.132) 
       Five children or more 0.006 
(0.077) 
0.007 
(0.083) 
0.006 
(0.075) 
0.006 
(0.075) 
0.007 
(0.082) 
Economic controls 
Education dummies (less than high school degree is omitted base category) 
       High school degree 0.268 
(0.443) 
0.259 
(0.438) 
0.263 
(0.440) 
0.286 
(0.452) 
0.263 
(0.440) 
       Some College 0.329 
(0.470) 
0.337 
(0.473) 
0.318 
(0.466) 
0.333 
(0.471) 
0.343 
(0.475) 
       College graduate 0.286 
(0.452) 
0.253 
(0.435) 
0.328 
(0.469) 
0.243 
(0.429) 
0.306 
(0.461) 
Unemployed 0.069 
(0.253) 
0.077 
(0.270) 
0.067 
(0.250) 
0.070 
(0.255) 
0.057 
(0.232) 
State unemployment rate 8.161 
(1.593) 
9.222 
(1.550) 
8.040 
(1.426) 
7.970 
(1.423) 
7.082 
(1.479) 
Student 0.110 
(0.313) 
0.113 
(0.316) 
0.109 
(0.311) 
0.106 
(0.308) 
0.118 
(0.322) 
Income dummies (Relative to the Federal Poverty Line)a 
       Income <100FPL 0.144 
(0.351) 
0.160 
(0.367) 
0.126 
(0.331) 
0.163 
(0.369) 
0.131 
(0.337) 
       100FPL≤   
       Income<200FPL 
0.171 
(0.376) 
0.193 
(0.395) 
0.143 
(0.350) 
0.199 
(0.400) 
0.158 
(0.364) 
       200FPL≤  
       Income<300FPL 
0.162 
(0.368) 
0.167 
(0.373) 
0.148 
(0.356) 
0.175 
(0.380) 
0.166 
(0.372) 
       300FPL≤  
       Income<400FPL 
0.136 
(0.343) 
0.131 
(0.337) 
0.136 
(0.343) 
0.135 
(0.342) 
0.146 
(0.353) 
       400FPL≤  
       Income<500FPL 
0.106 
(0.308) 
0.098 
(0.297) 
0.113 
(0.317) 
0.099 
(0.299) 
0.115 
(0.319) 
       Income ≥500FPL 0.282 
(0.450) 
0.251 
(0.434) 
0.333 
(0.471) 
0.229 
(0.420) 
0.285 
(0.451) 
Exchange controls 
State set up own exchange 0.344 
(0.475) 
0.563 
(0.496) 
0.566 
(0.496) 
N/A N/A 
State exchange had glitches 0.084 
(0.277) 
0.065 
(0.246) 
0.178 
(0.383) 
N/A N/A 
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
aOur baseline model includes dummy variables for each year of age as well as dummy variables for each 10-point 
increment of the FPL (50 total dummies). To conserve space, we present our descriptive statistics for age and 
income in broader categories in this table.   
